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A BALANCING APPROACH: STATE FRANCHISE LAW
AND FEDERAL TRADEMARK LAW
INTRODUCrION

In May 1969, William Mariniello and Shell Oil entered a lease
and dealership agreement for a service station.1 Toward the end of
the initial three-year lease period, Shell notified Mariniello that the
lease would not be renewed. Then, in New Jersey Superior Court,
Mariniello initiated an antitrust suit against Shell; he also sought to
have the lease reformed to allow him to retain possession of the service station premises. After having the case removed to federal district
court, Shell counterclaimed and moved for summary judgment on the
lease reformation issue. The district court rejected William Mariniello's arguments that: 1) the lease contract should not be enforced
because Shell had violated antitrust laws; and 2) the lease should be reformed because it was an unconscionable contract. The district court
granted Shell's motion for summary judgment, finding that termination of the lease was the only issue properly in dispute and that, since
Mariniello had not surrendered the premises, no issue of material fact
2
remained to be tried.
5 (hereinafter
Six months later, in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello
referred to as Marinello (S)), a case involving similar issues between
Shell and Frank Marinello, William's brother, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Shell could not refuse to renew a servicestation lease without good cause. The lease-dealership agreement
between Shell and Frank Marinello contained a provision which allowed Shell to notify Marinello of its intention not to renew only 10
days prior to the expiration of the lease. The court found the lease
and dealership agreement to be part of an integral business relationship (a franchise). The New Jersey legislature had articulated the
state's public policy about franchises in the New Jersey Franchise
1. The lease provided for an initial three-year period, followed by renewal each
year. It allowed Mariniello to terminate by giving Shell 90 days notice and Shell to

terminate by giving Mariniello 30 days notice. It also provided that upon termination
Mariniello was to surrender possession of the premises to Shell. Mariniello v. Shell
Oil Co., 1973 Trade Cas. 93,478 (D.N.J. 1972).
2. Id.
3. 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1421 (1974). The
two brothers spell their surnames differently.
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Practices Act.4 However, the court found the statute was inapplidable
to the Shell-Marinello franchise since it had been formed prior to the
Act's enactment. Using its common-law power to declare unfair contractual provisions void as against public policy, the court struck the
lease termination provision. The court concluded that Frank Marinello's franchise "would have legal existence for an indefinite period
of time, subject to his substantially performing his obligations thereunder."5
On the basis of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision, William Mariniello moved to vacate the summary judgment previously
granted to Shell by the district court. He argued that the federal district court was bound by New Jersey's common law as announced by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case involving Frank Marinello
and Shell. 6 The district court denied the motion, holding that, since
Shell's trademark was registered federally under the Lanham Act, 7 and
since the Lanham Act gives a trademark owner the right to regulate
the use of its trademark, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
limiting this regulation violated the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 368 F. Supp. 1401
(D.N.J. 1974) (hereinafter referred to as Mariniello (F)).
The federal district court did not accept Shell's first argument
that the decision in Marinello (S) violated the contracts clause. 8 Under
the contracts clause, states have power to enact legislation prescribing
reasonable contract provisions; however, the states may not apply this
legislation retroactively. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Marinello
(.S), recognized this and accordingly did not reach its decision by applying the Franchise Practices Act to the Frank Marinello-Shell franchise, which was entered into before the Act's passage. Because the
4. Franchise Practices Act, N.J.
days written notification, in addition
terminate a franchise agreement.
5. 63 N.J. at 411, 307 A.2d at
amount of gasoline sold; amount of
premises of the service station were

§ 56:10-5 (Supp. 1974) requires 60
to a showing of good cause, for a franchisor to

STAT. ANN.

603. Some factors indicating "good cause" were:
time the service station was open; and how the
kept. The court accepted the trial court's deter-

mination of this issue.
6. The New Jersey common law regarding unilateral termination of servicestation leases was announced after the grant of Shell's motion for summary judgment.
The district court could have denied the motion to vacate on the ground that at the
time the motion for summary judgment was granted the district court had correctly
interpreted New Jersey law.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1971).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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contracts clause may be used to invalidate a judicial decision only
when that decision has directly implemented a statute, the federal
district court in Mariniello (F) concluded the contracts clause question could not be reached.
The federal district court did accept Shell's second argument,
that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision was not controlling
because it violated the supremacy clause. 9 The district court found
that the state court, in reaching its decision, must have relied on the
Franchise Practices Act rather than the state's common law, since the
policies and practical effect of the decision were identical with those
of the statute. The district court concluded that Marinello (S) was an
interpretation of the Franchise Practices Act and the supremacy clause
issue could be decided.
According to the district court, the Lanham Act, under which
Shell had registered its trademark, was at issue because the Franchise
Practices Act defined a franchise to include the licensing of trademarks, including federally registered trademarks. Judge Coolahan,
writing for the court, stated that Congress in enacting the Lanham Act
had intended to preempt the field of trademark regulation. Consequently the states were without authority to legislate in that area. On
this ground, the court found the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act
to be invalid.
The court also found that the decision in Marinello (S) violated
the supremacy clause because it conflicted with the Lanham Act. The
Lanham Act gives the owner of a registered trademark the right to
use the trademark and to prevent others from using it.1 By extending

the service-station lease beyond the date on its face, New Jersey had
changed the trademark licensing term from a definite to an indefinite
period of time. According to the district court, this constituted "both
a substantive enhancement of the franchisee's rights in the trademark,
and a corresponding substantive impairment of the franchisor-registrant's rights in his trademark."' 1 Citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 2 the
court concluded that the "irreconcilable conflict" between New Jersey
law and the federal Lanham Act demanded the invalidation of the
9. Id. art. VI, c. 2.
10. See 368 F. Supp. at 1405-06; 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1971).
11. 368 F. Supp. at 1406.
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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state statute and the state court's decision.13 Because Congress had
intended to preempt the field of trademark regulation, and because
New Jersey law conflicted with the Lanham Act, the district court
held that Marinello (S) and the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act
could not be applied to the owners of federally registered trademarks.
I. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO FRANCHISING ABUSES
Franchising in the United States expanded from an estimated
50,000 franchises in 1955 to 600,000-700,000 in 1970.14 It now accounts
for about 12 percent of the gross national product and 80 percent of
annual retail sales.1 5 Franchising has become popular because it combines the most advantageous features of both large and small business.
Those who otherwise might not be able to own a business are given an
opportunity to operate one. The franchisee's initiative, enthusiasm,
and customer contact are important contributions to the arrangement. The franchisor, in turn, provides an established market, economies of scale resulting from a large distribution system and the
practical knowledge for operating a business. Although franchising
arrangements may vary greatly, all involve "a license from the owner
of a trademark or trade name, the franchisor, permitting another, the
franchisee, to market a product or service under the franchisor's name
or mark."' 6
That a large national franchisor may be able to abuse franchising
agreements because of the unequal bargaining powers of the parties
has been recognized by commentators,17 courts and legislatures. Beginning in the 1960's, many franchisors were found to have abused the
franchising arrangement by violating antitrust laws. In FTC v. Texaco,
Inc., 8 Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 9 and Shell Oil v. FTC,20 oil com13. 368 F. Supp. at 1407.
14. Lightman, Economic Aspects of Trademarks in Franchising, 14 IDEA 481
(1971).
15. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Minority Small Business Enterprise and
Franchising of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1973).
16. Id. at 5.
17. E.g., Brown, Franchising, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1972); Brown & Cohen,
Franchise Misuses, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1145 (1973); Symposium-The Franchise
Relationship, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 641 (1972).
18. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
19. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
20. 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
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panies were found to have forced their franchised dealers to purchase
tires, batteries and accessories. The Court found that the standard one
year service-station lease allowing cancellation on short notice gave the
oil companies an unfair advantage in the relationship. The threat of
lease cancellation by the oil companies constituted sufficient "coerdon" to support a finding of unfair trade practice in violation of

section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Franchisors also
have been found to have violated section one of the Sherman Act

through illegal tying agreements, 21 resale price maintenance, 22 and
23
"horizontal" territorial restrictions.
Legislatures also have become aware of the disproportionate power
of the parties to a franchise agreement. 24 In Congress several bills have
been introduced and hearings have been held, but only legislation

regulating automobile franchising has been enacted. 25 Recognizing the
potential for abuse of franchising, some states have enacted legislation.

The state statutes range from those requiring franchisors to disclose
all franchise terms to prospective franchisees 26 to those requiring enumerating the circumstances in which franchise agreements may be

terminated unilaterally by franchisors.2 7 Courts now are deciding
whether this legislation is constitutional. Both the Puerto Rico Fran-

chise Law and the Delaware Franchise Security Law have been found
21. E.g., Warring Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Co., 463 F.2d 1002
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448
F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
22. E.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
23. E.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
24.
Whereas, the relationship between franchised distributors and their suppliers and licensors is marked by economic dependence of the franchised
distributor; and Whereas, the suppliers and licensors of franchised distributors
have terminated franchises on short notice without just cause, and have
threatened and continue to threaten such termination; and Whereas, such
unjustified terminations unfairly deprive franchised distributors of their equity
and the fruits of their labor after they have created a favorable market for
the products, trademarks and trade names of their suppliers and licensors; and
. . . Whereas, these detrimental conditions cannot be remedied through
bargaining because of the franchised distributors' lack of bargaining power ....
Preamble to Franchise Security Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2551 (Supp. 1970).
25. Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-22 (1971).
26. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.06(5) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
27. E.g., Conn. Public Act No. 74-292 (Conn. Leg. Serv. Feb. Sess. 1974);
Franchise Security Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2551-57 (Supp. 1970); Franchise
Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56.10-5 (Supp. 1974); Franchise Investment Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100 (Supp. 1973).
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to be unconstitutional impairments of the obligation of contracts because of their retroactive application. The damage remedy of the Delaware Franchise Security Law also has been found to deprive franchisors
of property without due process of law.28 The federal district court in
Mariniello(F) is the only court to have considered the constitutionality
of state legislation controlling franchise termination provisions.
The franchisor's termination or nonrenewal of a lease with only
short notice to the franchisee may be thought of as an abuse of the
franchising system independent of any antitrust violations. Before a
franchisee acquires a franchise, he must make an investment in the
business, and after the franchise is acquired, he must expend his labor
to build up business. "Surely no person would make the kind of investment in money, time, and effort as did [the franchisee] without
the reasonable expectation that if he substantially performed his obligations to [the franchisor] the latter would continue to renew his
lease and dealership."2 9
The franchisee rarely improves his bargaining position with the
franchisor since the only real asset he has is the goodwill developed at
the site of the business. He usually must accept the lease-dealership
contract with short-term termination provisions as drafted by the franchisor. Although the expense and inconvenience of locating a new franchisee may deter the franchisor from terminating the franchise, the
franchisee has more to lose economically upon termination of the franchise. Consequently the franchisor uses the short-term cancellation
provisions more often than does the franchisee. By forbidding termination or nonrenewal except for "good cause," the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Marinello (S) tried to remove the element of capriciousness
and "unfair surprise" which had been evident in franchise terminations.
The district court in Mariniello (F) nullified New Jersey's at.
tempt to use both common law and legislation to control unilateral
franchise termination by franchisors. Other than the New Jersey
Supreme Court, only one court had tried to remedy the problem of
franchise termination abuse by using common-law doctrines.30 Because
28. Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del. 1971);
Fornais v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970) (Puerto Rico law).
29. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 350, 373-74, 294 A.2d 253, 262
(1972) (trial court's opinion concerning the Frank Marinello-Shell lease).
30. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1972) the New York City Civil Court described a gasoline franchisor-
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of the paucity of judicial decisions in this area, Mariniello (F) may
be regarded as an important precedent by other courts facing similar
issues. If the district court's decision is followed, the states will be
powerless to protect franchisees.

II. THE

SUPREMACY

CLAUSE ANALYSIS

In Goldstein v. California3l the Supreme Court provided two
tests, either of which may be used in determining whether a state
statute must fail under the supremacy clause: 1) whether Congress
intended to preempt the field; or 2) whether the state statute conflicts with federal law. Judge Coolahan, in Mariniello (F), used both
tests.
A. Did CongressIntend to Preempt the Field?
Judge Coolahan noted that congressional intent may be found
on the face of the statute. He thought that Congress' intent in passing
the Lanham Act was disclosed in the passage: "to protect registered
trademarks used in such commerce from interference by State, or
territorial legislation.132 He found that Congress had fully occupied
the field of federally registered trademarks, and that consequently,
the states have no authority to legislate in this field. He reasoned that
Marinello (S)used the Franchise Practices Act to interfere with a
trademark owner's relationship with his licensee. Because this relationship was governed by the Lanham Act, he concluded that Marinello
(S) was inapplicable to owners of federally registered trademarks.
That Judge Coolahan misconstrued congressional intent is apparent from an examination of both the complete declaration of confranchisee relationship as a fiduciary one because the franchisee had entrusted the
franchisor with his investment in money and effort, and because of the "great disparity
of the parties, the intimacy of their relationship, and the complexity of the transaction." Id. at 403, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The franchisor's abuse of this fiduciary
relationship led the court to apply equitable principles in dismissing MobiPs petition
for repossession of the service station premises after Rubenfeld had refused to vacate
at the expiration of his lease. Although an argument was presented on facts similar
to those in Marinello (S) that a lease should be reformed using common law doctrines, the district court, in Capuano 'v. Shell Oil, 5 TRADE R G. RFP.
74,966 (D.
Conn. March 7, 1974), reached a decision based on an non-assignment clause of the
lease.
31. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).

32.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1971).
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gressional intent in the Lanham Act and the historical background
leading to its enactment. Trademarks, dependent on use and appropriation by their owners for existence, have existed in the common
law for many centuries. Prior to 1946, when the Lanham Act was
passed, a limited federal registration statute and many state trademark registration statutes were in effect. As explained in the Senate
report, the purpose of the Lanham Act was "to place all matters relating to trademarks in one statute ... to eliminate judicial obscurity,

to simplify registration and to make it stronger and more liberal, to
dispense with mere technical prohibitions . . : to make procedure

simple and relief against infringement prompt and effective."83 The
Lanham Act fulfills these objectives by providing a "federally controlled place of registration" without changing the common law of
trademarks. 4 The state interference with trademarks which Congress
wished to prevent through the Lanham Act was limited to situations
of conflicting state and federal registration,3 5 and did not reach, as
Judge Coolahan found, all matters which might touch trademarks.
The federal district court in Mariniello (F) relied on two cases
to support its conclusion that Congress intended to preempt all state
legislation which might affect trademarks. However, an analysis of
these cases indicates a more limited interpretation of congressional
intent. In Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele,386 the question was whether the
owner of a federally registered trademark was entitled to an order
enjoining the use of his trademark in Mexico by a United States
national. In finding he was so entitled, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit stated that Congress intended to regulate trademarks'
use in interstate and foreign commerce to the fullest extent. Rather
than indicating that Congress intended to regulate every event or
transaction which might touch upon trademarks, as claimed by Judge
Coolahan, this case merely indicates that remedies afforded to the
owner of a federally registered trademark are not limited because the
trademark infringement has occurred outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.
33. SENATE COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADE-MARx-s-REISTRATION
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946).

AND PROTECTION,

34. Callmann, The New Trade-Mark Act of July 5, 1946, 46 COLUm. L. REV.
929, 938 (1946).
35. Derenberg, At the Threshold of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 37 TRADEMARK
REP. 297 (1947).

36. 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
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Where a concurrent use of similar trademarks was found in the
sale of only four cases of bourbon, the court in A. Smith Bowman
Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distributors, Inc.,3 7 ordered one of the
trademarks cancelled. In Mariniello (F), Judge Coolahan used a statement from Schenley to support his conclusion about congressional
intent: "Congress here intended to regulate all it constitutionally
could." 38 However, this statement should be considered in the context of the court's discussion. Because the power to enact the Lanham
Act was derived from the commerce power, the question in the case
was whether the sale of four cases of bourbon in interstate commerce
was sufficient commerce to allow the Lanham Act to be used. In
making the above statement, the court in Schenley only was referring
to Congress' power under the commerce clause.
B. Does New Jersey Law Conflict with the Lanham Act?
The district court in Mariniello (F) indicated that the extension
of a franchise beyond the expiration date of the service-station lease
caused New Jersey law to conflict with the Lanham Act because this
extension impaired "the franchisor-registrant's rights in his trademark"30 and at the same time increased the franchisee's rights in that
same trademark. The Lanham Act provision allowing "exclusive
use" of a trademark by the trademark registrant 4 was interpreted in
effect to mean that any state regulation of trademark licensing interfered with that right.
To support this holding the district court relied on Burger King
of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots4' and Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr.
Donut, Inc.42 In Burger King, the question was which of two com-

peting users had the right to use the trademark "Burger King." The
court decided that the state registered trademark had established prior
usage and, therefore, was valid only in those geographic areas where
it was used prior to the registration of the competing user under the
Lanham Act. In Mister Donut, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit would not allow California law to be used to determine
37. 198 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1961).
38. 368 F. Supp. at 1406.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1971).
403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
418 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969).
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priority of trademark use, because to do so would elevate th6 California statute above the Lanham Act. Both Burger King and Mister
Donut deal with the relationship of state trademark legislation with
federal trademark legislation. In contrast Mariniello (F) is concerned
with the problem of the relationship of state law regulating business
with federal trademark law, and, therefore, the district court's use
of both cases was inappropriate.
The approach of the district court in Mariniello (F) was somewhat analogous to that of the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co. 43 There the Court held that state unfair competition
law conflicted with federal patent law where Illinois had prohibited
copying of an article unprotected by a patent. The Court reasoned
that Congress in enacting patent laws had carefully balanced the
interest of encouraging invention against the interest of permitting
public access to inventions, and had decided to reward invention by
the grant of a 17-year statutory monopoly in exchange for full disclosure of the invention. When a state attempted to protect a nonpatentable invention, it upset this careful balance. Similarly, Judge
Coolahan seemed to indicate that the lease extension by the state
court afforded new trademark rights to one not within the Lanham
Act's protection, thus upsetting the balance Congress had drawn
in the Lanham Act.
Whether a Sears analysis is still valid is questionable in light of
the Supreme Court's later decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.44 In finding that Ohio trade secret law (as distinguished from
the unfair competition law in Sears) did not conflict with federal
patent law, the Court used a new balancing test. Federal patent considerations were balanced against the state interest of protecting trade
secrets. The Court concluded that the state interest in keeping its
trade secret law outweighed any federal interests, even where the
trade secret law protected an unpatented but patentable discovery.
The federal-state interest balancing method used by the Court in
Kewanee may require a result different from that reached by the
federal district court in Mariniello (F).
Trademarks, like patents, balance the need for commercial incentive (as manifested by the right for exclusive use of the trade43. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
44. 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974).
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mark)* against the need for free use of that same trademark. 45 Unlike
patents, where Congress has used a 17-year period to achieve this
balance, the trademark balance is always self-maintained because a
trademark's duration depends on its proper use, not upon the trademark statute. When the need for exclusive use of the trademark declines to the point where the trademark has become a common term,
the right for one owner to use it exclusively ends. With trademarks,
unlike patents, an additional interest is present: that of the consumer
in identifying the producer or manufacturer and in avoiding mistaking other similar products for the trademarked product. This consumer interest is protected by the trademark owner in two ways: 1)
he can bring an action against, the infringing trademark user; and
2) he is prohibited from licensing his trademark without sufficient
control over the licensee so that uniform quality of the product is
insured. If he fails to exercise sufficient control, abandonment of his
trademark may be inferred, and he may lose the right of exclusive
use of the trademark.
The district court in Mariniello (F) may have been concerned
with the possibility of state interference with the trademark owner's
need to protect his own goodwill or the public interest. However, the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Marinello (S) did not attempt to
change either of these interests. It did not attempt to curb the controls a trademark licensor exerts over his licensee. The state court indicated that the service-station lease would be extended only as long
as the franchisee "substantially complied with" the terms of his franchise. The state court found that Frank Marinello had substantially
complied with the terms of his franchise agreement. However, in
other circumstances a court might find a franchisee's violation of
trademark licensing provisions would not meet the substantial compliance test. Good cause for franchise termination then would exist.
Since New Jersey would not prevent franchise termination under
these circumstances, its law does not impair the rights of a federally
registered trademark owner to impose trademark licensing controls
upon the franchisee.
A Kewanee analysis also requires an examination of New Jersey's
interest. The New Jersey legislature, in enacting the Franchise Prac45. The analysis of the interest balancing of a trademark is drawn from Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 873 (1971).
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tices Act, and the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Marinello (S), were
attempting to control one aspect of franchising abuse: the unilateral
termination of franchise agreements by franchisors. Both the legislature and the court determined that the best interest of the public
demanded such control.
The state's interest, as expressed in Marinello (S) and the Franchise Practices Act, also coincides with several federal interests. By
removing the leverage a trademark licensor is able to exert over his
licensee, the state law may facilitate the enforcement of both state and
federal antitrust laws. Absent this leverage, the franchisor will be
unable to demand anticompetitive behavior from his licensee and
fewer antitrust laws may be violated. In addition, state franchising
laws may relieve the federal government from the burden of investigating and controlling franchise abuse through FTC action, 40 congressional legislation, or prosecution. Because New Jersey has important interests which do not infringe directly upon the Lanham Act,
an analysis consistent with Kewanee requires that the state law be
47
allowed to stand.

CONCLUSION

In resolving a supremacy clause question involving patents, the
Supreme Court, in Kewanee, has indicated that a state-federal interest
balancing approach is proper. To resolve supremacy clause questions
which involve trademarks, a court should use a similar balancing approach. Both the New Jersey Supreme Court and the New Jersey
legislature decided that because franchising is such a prevalent way
of doing business, it vitally affects the public interest of the state.
Both the court and the legislature recognized that a franchisor may
abuse franchising by terminating his franchisee's lease with short notice.
46. See FTC Proposed Rule Involving Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions

Concerning Franchising, 4 T.ADE REG. REP. ff 38,029, at 41,127-2 (Sept. 16, 1974);
20,716, at 20,585 (Sept.
Consent Order to Cease and Desist, 3 TRADE REo. REP.
17, 1974).
47. Because the district court in reviewing its grant of summary judgment to
Shell discussed only the Lanham Act, this article has been limited to an analysis of

trademark preemption. Other issues which must be considered are: 1) whether Shell's
alleged violation of antitrust laws would be sufficient defense to prevent enforcement of

the lease contract; and 2) the relationship of state contract law with federal trademark law.

FRANCHISE & TRADEMARK LAW

Both decided to intervene in the franchising contract to protect the
relatively powerless franchisee who must otherwise accept the lease
as offered to him by the franchisor. Both found the solution in requiring good cause for unilaterar termination of franchises by franchisors.
Since a franchise includes trademark licensing, state regulation
of franchising may touch upon federal trademark law-the Lanham
Act. The federal government has an interest in preserving the effectiveness of the Lanham Act and in protecting the benefits a trademark owner derives by registering his trademark under the Lanham
Act. However, the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act and the decision in Marinello (S) do not fail under the supremacy clause because
of the Lanham Act. Congress did not intend to preempt the field of
all state legislation touching trademarks. Nor does the New Jersey
statute or decision conflict with the purpose or operation of the
Lanham Act. Because New Jersey law does not conflict with the Lanham Act and because New Jersey has important interests in retaining
franchise controls, its law, as stated in Marinello (S) and the Franchise Practices Act, should be allowed to stand.
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